AGNTCon + MCPCon Europe 2026

We hand coding agents our workspace, our keys, and a shell, then walk away while they run code generated at runtime from untrusted input: files in the repo, docs fetched off the web, output from MCP servers nobody audited. The obvious fix is isolation: give every agent its own kernel. So we start there, running Claude Code, Codex, and others inside sub-second, hardware-isolated microVMs (libkrun/KVM), where even root in the guest is stuck behind the hypervisor's MMU boundary, not just a shared-kernel namespace.

But isolation on its own isn't enough. An isolated agent can still read the .env beside your code, exfiltrate it, wreck your workspace, or abuse a tool you never vetted. So we add defenses, live, one layer at a time: copy-on-write workspace snapshots with a per-file review gate, non-overridable secret exclusions, a DNS-aware egress firewall, a hardened Wolfi guest (custom Go PID 1, dropped capabilities, seccomp, no-new-privs), and an MCP proxy with Cedar authorization profiles. We finish on the attack surface most tools forget: the security tool's own config.

It's all Apache-2.0. The lesson carries to any agent you run: isolation is the floor, not the ceiling.